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1. The political ethics of immigration: justifying resistance
There is now a flourishing debate on the philosophy of immigration law and 
policy. Within this debate, however, the focus has predominantly been on what 
John Rawls calls “principles which apply to institutions,” to the relative neglect 
of “principles for individuals”1—the principles that comprise what we might call 
the political ethics of immigration. Rather than asking how the institutions that 
regulate immigration should be structured, the political ethics of immigration 
asks how individuals should act towards prevailing institutions.
 At the broadest level, the political ethics of immigration must determine 
whether individuals should practically accept institutions regulating immigra-
tion, or whether they should instead resist those institutions.2 Practical accep-
tance involves allowing one’s conduct to be regulated by institutional rules and 
directives. This is crucially distinct from substantively assenting to or endorsing 
institutional rules. For this reason, contestation—acting to promote the repeal or 
reform a law or policy one disagrees with—can be perfectly consistent with prac-
tical acceptance. For example, an individual might use legally permitted means 
to oppose an immigration law she dissents from, even while abiding by its direc-
tives as long as it remains legally valid. Similarly, when individual citizens who 
occupy some official role in the monitoring and enforcement of immigration law 
act to mitigate the impact of a specific immigration law they object to by exercis-
ing their legally recognized powers of official discretion, their actions are again 
consistent with practical acceptance.3
 By contrast, resistance involves a refusal to regulate one’s conduct by pre-
vailing institutional rules and directives. Resistance can be undertaken both 
by would-be migrants and by existing citizens of a receiving state.4 The for-
mer will be directed at primary immigration law, that is, the regime of laws 
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 1. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, 1971) at 108.
 2. See Philip Pettit, On the People’s Terms (Cambridge University Press, 2012) at 136-40.
 3. On the official discretion legally open to immigration agents in enforcing immigration law 
in the US context, and the significance of such discretion in mitigating the effects of unjust 
immigration laws, see Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Outside the Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2014) at 26.
 4. I use the term “citizen” broadly to include settled noncitizen residents who may also be ad-
dressed by secondary immigration law. Citizens of a state in this broad sense I will also refer 
to as “members” of that state.
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that regulates noncitizens’ entry into and residence in a receiving state’s terri-
tory. Would-be migrants’ resistance can take several forms. The most radical 
would be revolutionary activity aimed at dismantling existing arrangements 
for the enactment, application, and enforcement of immigration law, namely 
arrangements whereby each independent state unilaterally wields the power to 
regulate immigration to its territory. Would-be migrants might also use violent 
means to actively repel immigration monitoring and enforcement efforts by the 
receiving state’s agents. At the most basic level, individual would-be migrants 
can nonviolently refuse compliance with the directives of primary immigra-
tion law. For example, they can enter a state’s territory without authorization, 
nonviolently escaping monitoring and enforcement efforts by deception. Such 
nonviolent breaches of immigration law I call mere noncompliance to distin-
guish them from instances of noncompliance that involve the use of force or 
that aim at a revolutionary outcome.5
 For citizens of a receiving state, the target of their resistance will be second-
ary immigration law, that is, the regime of laws that directs certain individuals 
among a receiving state’s existing citizenry to participate in or contribute to 
the implementation—the application and enforcement—of their state’s primary 
immigration law. Again, resistance can take several forms. At a basic level, 
individual citizens might resist their state’s secondary immigration law by non-
violently refusing compliance with secondary immigration law. For example, a 
social services provider may refuse to comply with immigration reporting re-
quirements, or an employer may knowingly hire workers with forged work per-
mits. Given that a single citizen’s mere noncompliance will typically have little 
effect on the capacity of her state to implement its primary immigration law, an 
individual citizen might go further in destabilizing or disabling her state’s im-
migration monitoring and enforcement mechanisms by actively blocking other 
citizens’ participation in such efforts. Finally, citizens might undertake revolu-
tionary activity to overthrow and radically remake their state’s existing institu-
tions for regulating immigration.
 I hope, in this article, to advance our understanding of when and why resis-
tance to immigration law is morally justified. My focus will be circumscribed in 
two ways. First, I consider only the basic case of mere noncompliance, whether 
with primary or secondary immigration law. Because other forms of resistance 
typically involve the use of coercion or violence, their overall justifiability de-
pends on further criteria governing the use of force, such as whether their targets 
are morally liable to attack, and whether the force used is necessary and propor-
tionate.6 By focusing here on the justifiability of mere noncompliance, I bracket 
the thorny questions surrounding whether and how these criteria apply.
 5. I take violence to be actions that use, or threaten to use, force against others.
 6. For an overview of the criteria governing the central case of the justified use of force, namely 
self-defensive force, see Christian Coons & Michael Weber, “The Ethics of Self-Defense: The 
Current Debate” in Christian Coons & Michael Weber, eds, The Ethics of Self-Defense (Oxford 
University Press, 2016) 1.
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 Secondly, I consider only the justifiability of the immigration law of consti-
tutional democracies. To be clear, in referring to constitutional democracies, I 
do not mean to include all states conventionally recognized as, or that describe 
themselves as, liberal or constitutional democracies. Rather, I am referring to 
states that are properly judged to be constitutional democracies: at a minimum, 
such a state must equally protect all its citizens’ basic rights, including their rights 
to political participation, and must provide all citizens with sufficient resources 
to meaningfully exercise these rights. I focus on constitutional democracies be-
cause, although migration to authoritarian or otherwise illiberal states is an im-
portant phenomenon empirically, constitutional democratic receiving states have 
a special theoretical significance within the broadly liberal framework which I 
presuppose.
 My questions are therefore:
 1.  When and why are individual citizens of a constitutional democracy D mor-
ally justified in nonviolently breaching the secondary immigration law of D?
 2.  When and why are would-be migrants to a constitutional democracy D mor-
ally justified in nonviolently breaching the primary immigration law of D?
In speaking of morally justified instances of mere noncompliance, I mean to dis-
tinguish justification from permission. An act is morally permitted if it does not 
violate any conclusive moral duties. An act is morally justified if it is not only 
morally permitted but, in addition, there are sufficient positive reasons to do it. 
Morally justified actions so understood include, but are not limited to, morally 
required actions.7
 As I indicated earlier, such questions concerning the political ethics of im-
migration have so far received scant attention in the philosophical literature. A 
pair of recent articles by Javier Hidalgo offers the most sustained treatment of 
the justifiability of noncompliance with primary and secondary immigration law 
known to me.8 With respect to the first of my questions, Hidalgo claims that it is 
morally justified for an individual citizen of a receiving state to violate particu-
lar secondary immigration laws, when and because those laws are unjust.9 With 
 7. See Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (Oxford University Press, 2009) at 43; Zofia Stemplowska 
& Adam Swift, “Dethroning Democratic Legitimacy” in David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne & 
Steven Wall, eds, Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, vol 4 (Oxford University Press, 
2018) 3 at 4 n 1 [Stemplowska & Swift, “Dethroning”].
 8. In addition to Hidalgo’s account, there are other arguments that indirectly address the justifi-
ability of noncompliance with immigration law by examining whether immigration law has 
legitimate authority. Notable examples include Christopher Heath Wellman & Phillip Cole, 
Debating the Ethics of Immigration (Oxford University Press, 2011) at ch 1; Colin Grey, 
Justice and Authority in Immigration Law (Hart, 2015) at chs 1, 3-5; Margaret Moore, A 
Political Theory of Territory (Oxford University Press, 2015) at ch 9; David Miller, Strangers 
in Our Midst (Harvard University Press, 2016) at ch 4.
 9. Javier Hidalgo, “The Duty to Disobey Immigration Law” (2016) 3:2 Moral Philosophy & 
Politics 165 [Hidalgo, “Duty to Disobey”]. Hidalgo specifically claims that citizens are mor-
ally required to disobey unjust secondary immigration laws. This is consistent with my for-
mulation that, on his view, disobedience is justified, since all morally required acts are also 
morally justified.
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respect to the second of my questions, Hidalgo claims that it is morally justified 
for a would-be migrant to violate particular primary immigration laws, when and 
because those laws are unjust.10 
 At the core of Hidalgo’s account, then, is the claim that the injustice of a par-
ticular primary or secondary immigration law is sufficient to justify mere non-
compliance. I believe, however, that this justice-focused standard is mistaken, 
since if immigration law has legitimate authority, then noncompliance with some 
unjust immigration laws may be impermissible. In this article, I will explain why 
Hidalgo’s proposed justice-focused account should be rejected, and will develop 
a contrasting legitimacy-focused account of the justifiability of noncompliance 
with the immigration law of a constitutional democracy.11 I will also suggest that 
a more complete account of justified mere noncompliance with secondary immi-
gration law must go beyond Hidalgo’s exclusive focus on private, personal acts 
of disobedience to consider justified cases of public civil disobedience.
 I propose to proceed as follows. In Section 2, I will consider would-be mi-
grants’ mere noncompliance with the primary immigration law of a constitutional 
democratic receiving state, arguing that they are morally justified in nonviolently 
breaching particular primary immigration laws of such states only if the laws in 
question lack legitimate authority. I will then briefly offer a qualified defense of 
the legitimate authority of constitutional democracies’ regimes of primary immi-
gration law in Section 3. I go on in Section 4 to argue that mere noncompliance 
by individual citizens of a constitutional democracy with particular secondary 
immigration laws is morally justified only if the laws in question lack legitimate 
authority. Section 5 will then explain how citizens’ justified noncompliance with 
secondary immigration law can take the form not only of personal disobedience 
but also of civil disobedience.
2. Resistance by migrants: mere noncompliance with primary 
immigration law
The primary immigration law of a receiving state is that regime of laws that 
regulates the terms under which persons who are neither legal citizens nor le-
gal permanent residents are authorized to enter and remain on its territory for 
the purposes of work and residence. When, and why, is mere noncompliance 
by would-be migrants with the specific laws and directives of a constitutional 
democracy’s primary immigration law morally justified? According to Hidalgo, 
mere noncompliance is justified whenever a particular primary immigration law 
 10. Javier Hidalgo, “Resistance to Unjust Immigration Restrictions” (2015) 23:4 J Political 
Philosophy 450 [Hidalgo, “Resistance”].
 11. I understand justice to assess the substantive moral merits and demerits of social and politi-
cal institutions, especially in connection with whether these institutions honor various con-
stituencies’ entitlements to resources useful for human flourishing. By contrast, legitimacy 
assesses when political institutions are morally worthy of practical acceptance and support, 
even in the face of disagreement about the justice of its decisions. For similar understandings 
of the broad concept of legitimacy, see Pettit, On The People’s Terms, supra note 2 at 136-40; 
Allen Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2013) at ch 5; Allen 
Buchanan, “Institutional Legitimacy,” supra note 7 at 53.
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is unjust. His argument for this view appeals to a generally applicable principle 
of justified self- and other-defense. This principle makes two claims. First, if an 
individual faces an unjust threat of harm, then she is morally justified in taking 
nonviolent action to avert this threat. Second, an individual is morally justified in 
taking nonviolent action to avert unjust threats of harm to others.12
 By preventing would-be migrants from living and working in a territory of 
their choosing, immigration restrictions harm them in various ways. They also 
harm some individuals who already reside in the receiving state. When primary 
immigration laws restricting immigration are unjust, their application and en-
forcement thus amounts to an unjust threat of harm to would-be migrants and/
or existing members of the receiving state. In nonviolently breaching unjust pri-
mary immigration laws, Hidalgo contends, would-be migrants avert (or contrib-
ute to averting) the unjust threats of harm these laws pose.13 By the principle of 
self- and other-defense, these acts of mere noncompliance are morally justified. 
As I understand his view, Hidalgo thus endorses what I call the
Mere Injustice PrinciplePIL: Would-be migrants to a constitutional democracy D are 
morally justified in nonviolently breaching a particular primary immigration law 
LP enacted and applied by D according to its established procedures if LP is unjust.
For him, the injustice of a primary immigration law is sufficient for mere non-
compliance by would-be migrants to be justified.
 However, it is doubtful that justified self- and other-defense extends as far 
as Hidalgo’s argument supposes. Certainly, we are morally justified in using at 
least nonviolent means to defend ourselves and others against imminent threats 
of harm that violate what might be called “natural prohibitions on the use of 
force.”14 To put this in Lockean terms, it is morally justified to enforce the law 
of nature, understood as basic and uncontroversial moral principles that forbid 
threats to others’ self-preservation. As Locke argued, when in the state of nature, 
individuals are justified in enforcing the law of nature themselves. Within the 
context of a political society, if the government violates rather than upholds the 
law of nature, individuals are justified in enforcing the law of nature against the 
government by various acts of resistance.15 But, particularly in this latter context 
and other contexts where political institutions are well established, it is far less 
clear that individuals are justified in acting to shield themselves or others from 
unjust threats in cases where life and limb are not at stake.
 12. Hidalgo, “Resistance,” supra note 10 at 455, 458. While Hidalgo uses the terms “unjust” 
and “unjustified” interchangeably in referring to threats of harm, I will use the term “unjust” 
throughout.
 13. Ibid at 456-58. In articulating his view, Hidalgo focuses for illustrative purposes on immi-
gration restrictions that are unjust in virtue of denying admission to would-be migrants who 
have no prospect of obtaining adequate protection for their human rights without migrating. 
Nevertheless, he insists that his argument “applies to any unjust immigration restrictions.” Ibid 
at 454 n 16 [emphasis added].
 14. Niko Kolodny, “Political Rule and Its Discontents” in David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne & Steven 
Wall, eds, Oxford Studies in Political Philosophy, vol 2 (Oxford University Press, 2016) at 51.
 15. John Locke, Two Treatises of Government, edited by P Laslett (Cambridge University Press, 
1988) at 2.7-8, 2.168, 2.241-2.
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 Indeed, the idea that acts of (even nonviolent) self- and other-defense are 
justified in response to every unjust threat is incompatible with accepting that 
at least some institutions have legitimate authority. For an institution to have 
legitimate authority over certain agents is for its rules to have a certain moral 
standing vis-à-vis those agents. This moral standing has two crucial aspects. 
First, the rules of such an institution are binding in the sense that they give the 
agents they address moral reasons to comply that normally or presumptively 
outweigh conflicting reasons, including moral reasons to shield themselves and/
or others from unjust threats. Second, the binding force of these rules is content-
independent. They do not bind in virtue of the merits of the actions that they 
require of their subjects, such as the fact that these actions promote justice. 
Rather, they bind in virtue of their source or provenance in the institution’s 
relevant rule-making procedures.16 Thus, if a political institution has legitimate 
authority, then its subjects have a presumptive moral duty to comply with its 
rules regardless of whether compliance with those rules would expose them or 
others to unjust threats. As such, even nonviolent defensive breaches of unjust 
laws or rules are not always justifiable.
 Focusing on the case of primary immigration law, the possibility that a con-
stitutional democracy’s regime of primary immigration law has legitimate au-
thority casts doubt on the central contention of the Mere Injustice PrinciplePIL, 
namely that the injustice of a primary immigration law is sufficient to make mere 
noncompliance by would-be migrants morally justified. Suppose that a receiving 
state’s procedures for enacting and applying primary immigration law satisfy 
the relevant conditions for (the outcomes of) such procedures to have legitimate 
authority over would-be migrants. We should then judge that state’s regime of 
primary immigration law as a whole, which is the outcome of the procedures in 
question, to have legitimate authority. Potential migrants would be under a pre-
sumptive, content-independent moral duty to comply with the various laws that 
together comprise that regime.
 The duty to comply with a regime of primary immigration law that has le-
gitimate authority is presumptive in the sense that, when a given law within 
that regime is tainted by a legitimacy-defeating condition, there is no conclu-
sive duty to comply with that particular law. Since I unfortunately lack the 
space here to provide an exhaustive list of legitimacy-defeating conditions, 
I will simply draw attention to perhaps most significant example. Following 
what Zofia Stemplowska and Adam Swift have aptly called the “convention-
al view,” I take it that there is no conclusive duty to comply with gravely or 
egregiously unjust laws—laws whose injustice exceeds a certain threshold of 
 16. On how authoritative directives give their addressees binding (or peremptory) and content-
independent moral reasons, see HLA Hart, “Commands and Authoritative Legal Reasons” 
in Essays on Bentham (Clarendon Press, 1982) at 243, 253-56; Joseph Raz, The Morality 
of Freedom (Clarendon Press, 1986) at 35-37; Scott Shapiro, “Authority” in Jules L 
Coleman, Kenneth Einar Himma & Scott J Shapiro, eds, Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence 
and Philosophy of Law (Oxford University Press, 2004) at 389; Thomas Christiano, The 
Constitution of Equality (Oxford University Press, 2008) at 244.
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seriousness—whatever the procedural source of these laws in question.17 In 
particular, would-be migrants have no conclusive moral duty to comply with 
egregiously unjust primary immigration laws, even when the laws in question 
are part of a regime of primary immigration law that, in virtue of its provenance, 
generally has legitimate authority. Absent egregious injustice or other legitima-
cy-defeating conditions, however, would-be migrants to a state whose regime of 
primary immigration law has legitimate authority “should refrain from violating 
[its primary] immigration laws, even if these laws are unjust to some degree,” as 
Hidalgo himself acknowledges.18 
 Bearing in mind the relevance of the legitimate authority of a receiving state’s 
primary immigration law to justified noncompliance with that law, I propose the
Illegitimacy PrinciplePIL: Would-be migrants to a constitutional democracy D are 
morally justified in nonviolently breaching a particular primary immigration law 
LP enacted and applied by D according to its established procedures only if either 
(1) D’s regime of primary immigration law lacks legitimate authority altogether, 
or (2) D’s regime of primary immigration law as a whole presumptively has le-
gitimate authority, but for LP in particular that presumptive legitimacy is defeated.
Note that whereas the Mere Injustice PrinciplePIL states a sufficient condition for 
justified mere noncompliance, the Illegitimacy PrinciplePIL simply states the con-
ditions necessary for mere noncompliance to be justified. Whether an individual 
would-be migrant would be justified in nonviolently breaching a primary immi-
gration law will also depend on whether, in the circumstances, she has sufficient 
positive reasons to so act. Much will therefore depend on the specific context.
 Nonetheless, I take it that when the necessary conditions for justified mere 
noncompliance set out by the Illegitimacy PrinciplePIL are met, would-be mi-
grants will often also have strong positive moral reasons to disobey. As I will 
argue in the next section, constitutional democracies’ regimes of primary im-
migration law normally have legitimate authority, and hence noncompliance by 
would-be migrants is only permissible in cases where a particular law’s legiti-
macy is defeated. Since a central legitimacy-defeating condition is egregious in-
justice, illegitimate primary immigration laws are in many instances egregiously 
unjust laws. Would-be migrants will have strong moral reasons—not least rea-
sons of self- and other-defense—to disobey such laws.
 As I previously pointed out, Hidalgo is aware that the possibility that a receiv-
ing state’s regime of primary immigration law has legitimate authority may make 
the injustice of the particular laws insufficient to justify noncompliance with those 
laws. Nevertheless, he claims, there is no difference in the practical implications 
of his justice-focused Mere Injustice PrinciplePIL and the legitimacy-focused 
 17. Stemplowska & Swift, “Dethroning,” supra note 7 at 5-7. While Stemplowska and Swift 
themselves reject the “conventional view,” it is widely accepted. See, for example, John 
Rawls, Political Liberalism (Columbia University Press, 1996) at 427-28; Christiano, The 
Constitution of Equality, supra note 16 at ch 7; Daniel Viehoff, “Democratic Equality and 
Political Authority” (2014) 42 Philosophy & Public Affairs 337; NP Adams, “In Defense of 
Content-Independence” (2017) 23:3 Legal Theory 143 at 150.
 18. Hidalgo, “Resistance,” supra note 10 at 459-60.
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Illegitimacy PrinciplePIL, since (even) constitutional democracies’ regimes of 
primary immigration law lack legitimate authority over would-be migrants. The 
strategy he pursues is to survey several standard accounts of the conditions for 
a state to have legitimate authority over its members, and to argue that these ac-
counts do not vindicate the legitimate authority of a constitutional democracy’s 
primary immigration law.19
 However, it should be no surprise that accounts of the legitimate authority of 
a state’s domestic law—that is, laws applying to a state’s existing members—do 
not offer the theoretical resources to explain how primary immigration law can 
have legitimate authority. Unlike a state’s domestic law, its primary immigra-
tion law applies to persons who are not already its members. Theories of the 
legitimate authority of domestic law typically appeal to some morally significant 
feature of shared membership in a state, such as democratic co-authorship of the 
laws, common participation in a cooperative scheme, or standing in a valuable 
relationship that generates associative obligations. As such, they are unlikely to 
be helpful in establishing the legitimacy of primary immigration law.
 Indeed, Hidalgo himself concedes this, noting that because the theories of 
legitimate authority and political obligation he surveys are concerned to show 
why the current citizens of a state are morally required to comply with their 
state’s domestic law, it is “unsurprising on reflection” that such theories have 
limited relevance for assessing the legitimacy of primary immigration law.20 
A more promising approach would be to examine instead theories of states’ 
international legitimacy, and to ask whether such theories can be extended to 
the case of primary immigration law. It is this approach that I will follow in the 
next section, where I argue that constitutional democracies’ regimes of primary 
immigration law normally have legitimate authority in virtue of those states’ 
international legitimacy.
3. International legitimacy and primary immigration law’s  
legitimate authority
Familiar judgments about the legitimate authority of a state’s domestic law are 
judgments about what might be called first-order legitimacy: this kind of le-
gitimacy concerns an institution’s moral standing vis-à-vis those directly subject 
to its political rule, that is, those whose conduct the institution’s rules seek to 
govern in the first instance. By contrast, second-order legitimacy judgments re-
late to an institution’s moral standing vis-à-vis third parties who are not directly 
subject to its rule, but who are in a position to affect—to offer various degrees of 
practical support for, or conversely to offer practical resistance to—that relation 
of rule between the institution and its claimed subjects. A state’s international le-
gitimacy is a kind of second-order legitimacy: an internationally legitimate state 
has a certain moral standing vis-à-vis the rest of international society, namely 
 19. Ibid at 460-46.
 20. Ibid at 466.
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other states and their individual members, in respect of its efforts to govern the 
resident population of its territory.21
 Specifically, what it is for a state to have international legitimacy is, inter alia, 
for it to enjoy a right to political independence. This right protects the righthold-
er state’s capacity to independently formulate and implement laws and policies 
in central and morally acceptable domains of domestic policymaking. In other 
words, the right protects the capacity of the state’s members to independently 
choose which morally permissible public policy goals they will collectively pur-
sue, and using what means. The correlative duty falls on international society, 
that is to say, other states and their members, requiring them to refrain from 
interfering in the rightholder state’s domestic governance. It is thus also often 
described as “a right to noninterference in internal affairs.”22
 This duty of noninterference is content-independent in the sense that it pre-
sumptively forbids interference by international society regardless of the moral 
merits or demerits of the specific domestic policies an internationally legitimate 
state chooses to implement, at least to the extent that these policies are not un-
dertaken in furtherance of clearly impermissible goals. Moreover, it is a bind-
ing moral duty that normally outweighs competing considerations; it does not 
simply reflect the tendency in practice for interference to be counterproductive 
or to cause international instability. These aspects of the duty of noninterference 
are captured in the helpful formulation that internationally legitimate states are 
owed “principled toleration” by international society for their domestic political 
decisions.23 This formulation brings out that the members of international society 
ought, for moral rather than simply prudential or strategic reasons, to avoid in-
terfering even with those domestic laws and policies of internationally legitimate 
states that they object to. 
 An internationally legitimate state’s right to political independence and in-
ternational society’s correlative duty of noninterference or principled toleration 
has important implications for the authority of such a state’s primary immigra-
tion law over would-be migrants. Immigration, especially on a large scale, will 
typically have a substantial impact on various aspects of the receiving state’s 
economy and society that the state’s domestic policies might reasonably seek 
to regulate. For example, the rate of immigration and the skill composition of 
the entering pool of immigrants tends to affect outcomes in the domestic labor 
market, the rate of labor productivity, levels of expenditure on social services 
and the welfare state, levels of government revenue, the size of aggregate eco-
nomic output, and other outcomes of concern to domestic economic and fiscal 
 21. To be clear, I do not claim that the legitimate authority of primary immigration law is a form 
of second-order legitimacy, only that international legitimacy is.
 22. Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination (Oxford University Press, 
2004) at 264. See also Andrew Altman & Christopher Heath Wellman, A Liberal Theory of 
International Justice (Oxford University Press, 2009) at 4.
 23. Michael Blake, Justice and Foreign Policy (Oxford University Press, 2013) at 59. To be clear, 
although Blake holds that states are sometimes owed principled toleration by international 
society, he himself avoids the notion of international legitimacy because he rejects the binary 
character of international legitimacy judgments in favor of a more scalar approach. Ibid at 
68-69.
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policy. Hence, there is a tight functional connection between, on the one hand, 
a state’s capacity to pursue its chosen domestic policy goals and implement its 
preferred policies and, on the other hand, its capacity to regulate immigration 
to its territory. A state that lacks an effective capacity to unilaterally regulate 
immigration will have its ability to shape relevant economic and social out-
comes within its territory according to its members’ choice impaired to a sig-
nificant degree.
 In light of this functional connection between the capacity to regulate immi-
gration and the capacity to govern domestically, I argue that the following spe-
cific duty is implied by the general duty of noninterference owed to internation-
ally legitimate states: international society is to refrain from actions and policies 
that will significantly undermine an internationally legitimate state’s capacity to 
independently regulate immigration to its territory without its consent.24 Since it 
is derived from a content-independent duty of noninterference, it too is content-
independent: it presumptively forbids international society from disrupting the 
regulations which an internationally legitimate state has placed on immigration 
to its territory, in virtue of their being the product of the state’s internal political 
decisions, not in virtue of their substantive moral merits or demerits.
 Assuming that a given state’s capacity to regulate immigration would be sig-
nificantly undermined if there was widespread noncompliance by would-be mi-
grants with its regime of primary immigration law, I argue that other states and 
their members—including and especially would-be migrants—are collectively 
required to prevent this level of noncompliance if the state satisfies the criteria 
for international legitimacy. Each individual would-be migrant to that state is 
then required to do her fair share in discharging this collective duty. This fair 
share consists in each would-be migrant’s compliance with the regime of pri-
mary immigration law of the state in question. Hence, would-be migrants to a 
state that has international legitimacy have a presumptive, content-independent 
moral duty to comply with the primary immigration laws that regulate admission 
to and residence in that state’s territory. We can say, equivalently, that when a 
state has international legitimacy, then its regime of primary immigration law has 
legitimate authority over would-be migrants.
 If I am right that, when a state is internationally legitimate and hence entitled 
to political independence, its regime of primary immigration law has legitimate 
authority, then whether constitutional democracies’ regimes of primary immigra-
tion law have legitimate authority depends on whether constitutional democra-
cies satisfy the conditions for international legitimacy. Lacking the space here to 
defend any particular account of the criteria for states to be legitimate vis-à-vis 
international society, I will simply appeal to the wide consensus that at least 
those states properly judged to be constitutional democracies enjoy international 
legitimacy, or in any case that aspect of international legitimacy that concerns us 
here, namely the right to political independence.
 24. A state may consent to have its capacity to independently regulate immigration curtailed by, 
for example, entering into a bilateral or multilateral agreement with other states to reciprocally 
allow freedom of movement. 
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 On one view, all states that recognize and protect basic human rights domesti-
cally are entitled to political independence.25 On another view, the conditions for 
international legitimacy are that a state adequately protects the human rights of 
its members and respects the human rights of nonmembers.26 A third view claims 
that a state is internationally legitimate if it adequately protects human rights 
internally, has at least a minimally democratic political system, respects human 
rights externally, and did not (recently) usurp the jurisdiction of another legit-
imate state.27 Finally, some philosophers claim that only liberal states—those 
whose institutions secure for all their members equal protection for the basic 
civil and political rights essential for individual autonomy—should be recog-
nized as internationally legitimate.28
 These accounts all suggest that (at least) constitutional democracies normally 
satisfy the conditions to enjoy a right to political independence. Any political 
society that satisfies the criteria to be properly judged a constitutional democracy 
will equally and adequately protect its members’ human rights. Constitutional 
democracies also tend to respect human rights in their dealings with other states, 
and to avoid aggressive war against legitimate states.29 On the assumption that 
this consensus about the international standing of constitutional democracies 
is sound, my argument in this section implies that a constitutional democratic 
state’s regime of primary immigration law normally has legitimate authority over 
would-be migrants. If so, then the Illegitimacy PrinciplePIL has substantially dif-
ferent practical implications than the Mere Injustice PrinciplePIL.
 Anticipating an argument of this kind, Hidalgo offers the following objection. 
Even if primary immigration law has legitimate authority, this legitimacy is de-
feated in the case of any particular law that restricts immigration in such a way 
as to directly threaten or foreseeably enable unjust harm to would-be migrants. 
The reason is that states “lack rights against external interference when they pose 
[unjust] threats to outsiders.”30 Whenever a state’s laws threaten or foreseeably 
enable unjust harm to outsiders, these outsiders’ presumptive duty to refrain from 
interfering in that state’s domestic governance is defeated, and thus their deriva-
tive duty to comply with its primary immigration law is also defeated.
 Note that, even if successful, this reply would not show that injustice to in-
siders is a defeating condition on the legitimacy of primary immigration law. 
Hence, it does not show that the Illegitimacy PrinciplePIL always has the same 
practical implications as the Mere Injustice PrinciplePIL. Nevertheless, the legiti-
mate authority of a constitutional democracy’s primary immigration law would 
be severely circumscribed if it is indeed defeated whenever a particular law poses 
a threat of unjust harm to would-be migrants or to nonmembers more generally. 
 25. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Harvard University Press, 1999) at 59-62, 78-81.
 26. Altman &Wellman, A Liberal Theory of International Justice, supra note 22 at 3-4.
 27. Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, supra note 22 at ch 6.
 28. Kok-Chor Tan, Toleration, Diversity, and Global Justice (Pennsylvania State University Press, 
2000) at ch 4; Blake, Justice and Foreign Policy, supra note 23 at ch 3.
 29. Michael Doyle, “Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs” (1983) 12:3 Philosophy & 
Public Affairs 203.
 30. Hidalgo, “Resistance,” supra note 10 at 467.
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It is thus worth interrogating whether an internationally legitimate state’s right to 
political independence covers only political decisions that wrong its own mem-
bers, but not decisions that wrong outsiders.
 To be sure, a state’s right to independence does not extend to political deci-
sions that directly violate the human rights of nonmembers, or even to decisions 
that shirk its required share of the international responsibility to act in defense 
of all individuals’ human rights when their own states are unable or unwilling to 
extend adequate protection. The legitimate authority of a constitutional democ-
racy’s regime of primary immigration law is thus defeated in the case of specific 
laws that directly violate or unjustly fail to defend the human rights of nonmem-
bers such as would-be migrants. To put this another way, such laws are tainted by 
egregious, legitimacy-defeating injustice.
 For example, the legitimacy of primary immigration laws that restrict the 
admission of refugees is defeated. Refugees, considered as a morally distinc-
tive category of potential migrants, are individuals who currently lack adequate 
protection for their human rights—including socioeconomic human rights—in 
their current state of residence and have no reasonable prospect of obtaining a 
domestic remedy for this deficiency in protection. They therefore need residence 
in some other state from which they can obtain surrogate protection for their hu-
man rights.31 Indeed, we could say that they have a (derivative) human right to 
obtain surrogate protection. At least under prevailing circumstances, where there 
is no effective international refugee responsibility-sharing scheme, a constitu-
tional democracy that has the capacity to offer such surrogate protection will be 
violating this derivative human right if it denies refugees admission.
 But we can also imagine other political decisions that an internationally le-
gitimate state might make in pursuit of some permissible domestic policy goal 
that, while unjust to outsiders to some degree, do not violate human rights. It 
seems that such decisions are protected by the state’s right to political indepen-
dence. Consider, as an example, an internationally legitimate state that enacts a 
customs law that, due to the effects of the schedule of tariffs it imposes, offends 
against some transnational principle of fairness in trade but does not violate hu-
man rights. It does not seem that this injustice against outsiders would permit 
nonmembers to smuggle goods into the state’s territory to evade the customs law 
in question.
 This case suggests that the international legitimacy of a state is not defeated 
whenever its political decisions threaten to unjustly harm nonmembers. Only 
when a certain threshold of egregious injustice is reached will a state’s interna-
tional legitimacy be defeated. This further suggests that injustice to would-be 
migrants or other outsiders is not always a defeating condition on the legitimate 
authority of primary immigration law. Although the primary immigration laws 
 31. For the idea that what distinguishes refugees is their need for surrogate or substitute protection, 
see Canada (Attorney General) v Ward [1993] 2 SCR 689; James Hathaway & Michelle Foster, 
The Law of Refugee Status, 2nd ed (Cambridge University Press, 2014) at 184-85, 287-94. For 
similar conceptions of refugeehood, see Matthew Gibney, The Ethics and Politics of Asylum 
(Cambridge University Press, 2004) at 7-9; David Owen, “In Loco Civitatis” in Sarah Fine & 
Lea Ypi, eds, Migration in Political Theory (Oxford University Press, 2016) at 276-80.
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of a constitutional democracy that violate or fail to properly defend the human 
rights of would-be migrants are illegitimate, this is not always true of other un-
just immigration laws of such a state.
 At this point, Hidalgo might insist in response that there is a human right to im-
migrate according to one’s choice: freedom of immigration is a human right. This 
line of response is more radical than the previous one, since its implication is that 
almost all primary immigration laws that restrict immigration are egregiously un-
just and hence illegitimate. In any case, if successful, this argument would again 
vitiate the practical difference between the Mere Injustice PrinciplePIL and the 
Illegitimacy PrinciplePIL. Indeed, it would cast serious doubt on the idea that any 
regime of primary immigration law—whatever its procedural provenance—could 
have legitimate authority, since presumably any legal regime that systematically 
violates human rights would lack legitimate authority.
 Proponents of freedom of immigration as a human right typically emphasize 
the value to individuals generally of being able to immigrate according to their 
choice: the absence of restrictions on their migration choices would greatly facili-
tate individuals’ access to valuable options outside their current state of residence, 
thereby promoting their fundamental interests in personal and even political au-
tonomy. They claim that because freedom of immigration serves fundamental in-
dividual interests in autonomy, it should receive protection as a human right, just 
as freedom of internal movement receives such protection.32
 Individuals certainly have important and valid interests in being free to immi-
grate according to their choice. Nevertheless, a successful argument for a human 
right to freedom of immigration cannot appeal only to the value for individuals 
of enjoying this kind of freedom. To vindicate that freedom as a human right, we 
would also need to show that, for any given individual, the members of political 
societies other than her own have the same kind of duty to serve her migration-
related interests as do the members of her own political society.
 If what individuals can rightfully claim from others and what they owe to 
others does not vary fundamentally based on which states they are members of, 
then this is easy to show. But if we instead hold, following internationalist views 
of global justice, that shared membership in a state is a morally significant so-
cial and political relation that grounds duties of justice that co-citizens specially 
owe each other, then there is a basis to resist the abovementioned assignment 
of duties.33 While the members of each state owe it to each other to secure one 
another’s fundamental autonomy interests through the establishment of a com-
mon scheme of equal basic rights, they have no comparable duty to promote 
the parallel interests of the members of other states. Hence, although freedom 
 32. Joseph Carens, The Ethics of Immigration (Oxford University Press, 2013) at ch 11; see Kieran 
Oberman, “Immigration as a Human Right”, supra note 31.
 33. Unfortunately, I lack the space here to defend internationalism as an account of global justice. 
Prominent defenses are offered in David Miller, National Responsibility and Global Justice 
(Oxford University Press, 2007); Andrea Sangiovanni, “Global Justice, Reciprocity, and 
the State” (2007) 35:1 Philosophy & Public Affairs 3 at 6-7; Altman & Wellman, A Liberal 
Theory of International Justice, supra note 22 at ch 6; Matthias Risse, On Global Justice 
(Princeton University Press, 2012) at 48-53; Blake, Justice and Foreign Policy, supra note 
23 at chs 1 and 4.
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of immigration would serve the fundamental autonomy interests of (would-be) 
migrants, there is no human right to that freedom.34
 To be clear, while I claim that there is no human right to immigrate according 
to one’s choice, I fully accept that there are human rights-based requirements 
on receiving states to authorize immigration in particular circumstances and for 
specific protected reasons. Two illustrative examples concern refugees and fam-
ily migration. As I noted earlier, refugees have a derivative human right to im-
migrate for the purpose of accessing surrogate human rights protection. Family 
migration provides another example. It has been plausibly argued that undue 
restrictions on the entry and settlement of noncitizens who are joined in certain 
family or other close, nonfungible personal relationships with existing citizens of 
the receiving state in question violate human rights—if not the human rights of 
the would-be migrants themselves then of the existing citizens who share the rel-
evant relationships with them. These arguments appeal to a human right to (the 
social bases) of those relationships that have a special connection to individual 
autonomy, a human right that is violated by immigration restrictions that unduly 
burden the maintenance of such relationships among persons who are separated 
by such restrictions.35 
 I have sketched a conditional argument for the view that there is no human right 
to freedom of immigration, even if there are human rights-based entitlements to 
immigrate in particular circumstances—conditional, that is, on the truth of some 
internationalist conception of global justice. Supposing that this argument is ac-
cepted, then primary immigration laws are not, in general, illegitimate because 
egregiously unjust. There is some range of laws regulating would-be migrants’ 
admission to a constitutional democracy that they are morally required to comply 
with even if those laws are to some degree unjust: the Illegitimacy PrinciplePIL 
does not, at a practical level, collapse into the Mere Injustice PrinciplePIL.
 Before turning my attention to secondary immigration law, I want to consider 
a further potential worry about my argument for the legitimate authority of a 
constitutional democracy’s regime of primary immigration law. My argument 
is, or may appear to be, similar in some ways to a number of other accounts 
defending—in the more familiar formulation within the extant philosophical 
literature—a (legitimate) state’s right to control immigration by appeal to a right 
to self-determination held by political or national communities. Some of these 
arguments have been subject to serious criticism. I want to suggest how my own 
view is able to escape these criticisms.
 Firstly, my argument does not depend on the controversial idea that the popu-
lation or citizenry of each state has a distinctive culture or national identity, and 
that the preservation of this distinctive culture or identity grounds a collective 
 34. I develop this argument at greater length in Caleb Yong, “Immigration Rights and the 
Justification of Immigration Restrictions” (2017) 48:4 J Social Philosophy 461. For a similar 
argument, see Adam Hosein, “Immigration and Freedom of Movement” (2013) 6:1 Ethics and 
Global Politics 25.
 35. See Matthew Lister, “Immigration, Association, and the Family” (2010) 29 Law & Phil 717; 
Caleb Yong, “Caring Relationships and Family Migration Schemes” in A Sager, ed, The Ethics 
and Politics of Immigration (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016).
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right to regulate the admission of migrants into the state’s territory and political 
membership.36 Rather, my argument traces the legitimate authority of a state’s 
regime of primary immigration law to its right, as an internationally legitimate 
state, to political independence. Moreover, while some might hold that the right 
to political independence itself is justified because it serves to protect and pre-
serve the distinctive culture or identity embodied within each state’s existing 
membership,37 my argument need not rely on this view given that other—argu-
ably more plausible—accounts of the grounds for the right to political indepen-
dence are available.38
 My view likewise does not depend on the argument that a constitutional dem-
ocratic state has a right to control immigration because such control is necessary 
to protect the capacity of its existing membership to determine the composition 
of the state’s future membership, which is in turn a central element of a state’s 
collective self-determination.39 This argument, which understands self-determi-
nation to require what Bas van der Vossen has called “self-creation,” has been 
criticized by him on the ground that when the ideal of self-creation is given a 
plausible interpretation, the regulation of immigration is normally not a precon-
dition for it.40 To accept my account, however, one need not hold that an inter-
nationally legitimate state’s control over the future composition of its member-
ship is among the domains of policymaking that international society must not 
interfere with. It is enough to accept the relatively uncontroversial idea that an 
internationally legitimate state’s right to political independence protects at least 
its independent political control over domestic economic and fiscal policy.
4. Citizens’ mere noncompliance with secondary immigration law
Many individuals among the current citizenry of a receiving state, in their capac-
ity as occupants of certain social (especially official) roles, are legally obligated 
to participate in implementing their state’s primary immigration law. Obviously, 
immigration officers—that is, public officials tasked with monitoring immigra-
tion and enforcing immigration law—are legally required to engage in efforts 
to detect and deter unauthorized immigration, as well as to carry out immigra-
tion enforcement, for example, by deporting unauthorized migrants. In addition, 
employers are prohibited from knowingly hiring noncitizens who are not legally 
authorized to access the labor market. Police officers, university administrators, 
 36. Cf Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice: a Defence of Pluralism and Equality (Basic Books, 
1983) at ch 2; Moore, Political Theory of Territory, supra note 8 at 199-200.
 37. Michael Walzer, Thinking Politically (Yale University Press, 2007) at chs 12-13.
 38. See, for example, Blake, Justice and Foreign Policy, supra note 23 at 59-67; Anna Stilz, “The 
Value of Self-Determination”, supra note 14; Sarah Song, “Why Does the State Have the 
Right to Control Immigration?” in Jack Knight, ed, Immigration, Emigration, and Migration: 
NOMOS LVII (New York University Press, 2017) 3 at 35-37.
 39. See generally Walzer, Spheres of Justice, supra note 36; Wellman & Cole, Debating the Ethics 
of Immigration, supra note 8 at 40-41; Miller, Strangers in our Midst, supra note 8 at 62-63; 
Moore, Political Theory of Territory, supra note 8 at 197.
 40. Bas van der Vossen, “Immigration and Self-Determination” (2015) 14:3 Politics, Philosophy 
& Economics 270 at 278-85.
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and various providers of public services may also be required to report suspected 
immigration offenses to immigration officers.41
 Hidalgo plausibly suggests that these directives of secondary immigration 
law, which he calls “interaction restrictions,” are unjust insofar as they serve to 
implement unjust primary immigration laws.42 A simple argument for this claim 
is that secondary immigration law is designed to facilitate the implementation 
of primary immigration law, and laws designed to facilitate other unjust laws 
are themselves unjust. In complying with secondary immigration laws that are 
unjust in this way, individual citizens of the receiving state in question causally 
contribute to the injustice of the primary immigration laws that are thereby im-
plemented; as such, they are complicit in injustice. Since individual citizens have 
a moral duty to avoid such complicity, Hidalgo argues, they are morally justified 
in refusing to comply with any secondary immigration law that is unjust.43 As I 
understand his view, he endorses what I call the
Mere Injustice PrincipleSIL: Individual citizens of a constitutional democracy D are 
morally justified in nonviolently breaching a particular secondary immigration law 
LS enacted and applied by D according to its established procedures if LS is unjust.
According to this principle, the injustice of a secondary immigration law is a suf-
ficient condition for mere noncompliance by individual citizens.
 The possibility that a constitutional democracy’s regime of secondary immi-
gration law has legitimate authority undermines the Mere Injustice PrincipleSIL. 
Recall that what it is for a political institution to have legitimate authority is 
for the rules issued by its established rule-making procedures to be binding on 
its subjects based on the rules’ procedural provenance and not on their content. 
Hence, if a receiving state’s procedures for enacting and applying secondary 
immigration law satisfy the relevant conditions for (the outcomes of) such pro-
cedures to have legitimate authority over its existing citizens, then individual 
citizens have a presumptive, content-independent moral duty to comply with the 
various laws that together comprise that state’s regime of secondary immigration 
law. To be sure, since this duty to comply with a regime of secondary immigra-
tion law that has legitimate authority is presumptive, in the case of particular 
laws where some legitimacy-defeating condition is present, citizens lack a con-
clusive duty to comply. As we have seen in Section 2, a major such condition is 
the presence of especially grave injustice: if a particular secondary immigration 
law is egregiously unjust, then there is no conclusive duty to comply, whatever 
the procedural provenance of that law might be.
 Nevertheless, if a state’s regime of secondary immigration law has legitimate 
authority, then when legitimacy-defeating conditions are absent, its citizens are 
morally required to comply even with particular laws that are unjust to some de-
gree—a duty that outweighs the competing moral reasons they have to avoid be-
ing complicit in injustice. Contrary to what the Mere Injustice PrincipleSIL holds, 
 41. Hidalgo, “Duty to Disobey,” supra note 9 at 169-70.
 42. Ibid at 170-72.
 43. Ibid at 172-75.
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then, the injustice of a secondary immigration law may not be sufficient to justify 
mere noncompliance by a receiving state’s existing citizens.
 Rejecting the Mere Injustice PrincipleSIL, I propose the
Illegitimacy PrincipleSIL: Individual citizens of a constitutional democracy D are 
morally justified in nonviolently breaching a particular secondary immigration law 
LS enacted and applied by D according to its established procedures only if either 
(1) D’s regime of secondary immigration law lacks legitimate authority altogether, 
or (2) D’s regime of secondary immigration law as a whole presumptively has le-
gitimate authority, but for LS in particular that legitimacy is defeated.
As with the earlier Illegitimacy PrinciplePIL, it is worth noting that the Illegitimacy 
PrincipleSIL states a necessary—not sufficient—condition for mere noncompli-
ance to be morally justified. To determine if mere noncompliance with an ille-
gitimate secondary immigration law is justified in a given case, we must make 
further assessments regarding whether there are sufficient positive reasons to 
nonviolently breach that law in the relevant circumstances. One type of circum-
stance in which there will be sufficient moral reasons for mere noncompliance, 
which I will further discuss below, is when a secondary immigration law is egre-
giously unjust.
 Hidalgo is aware of the challenge that the idea of legitimate authority poses 
to his account. His strategy in responding to this challenge is to argue that (even) 
constitutional democracies’ regimes of secondary immigration law lack legiti-
mate authority, and hence mere noncompliance with their secondary immigra-
tion laws is in fact justified whenever such laws are unjust.44 This line of re-
sponse attempts to show that, even if the appropriate standard by which to judge 
the justifiability of mere noncompliance must take the legitimacy or otherwise of 
secondary immigration law into account, the Illegitimacy PrincipleSIL collapses 
in practical terms into the Mere Injustice PrincipleSIL.
 In reply, I will indicate why a constitutional democracy’s regime of secondary 
immigration law does in fact have legitimate authority. I begin with the widely 
held view that the domestic law of a constitutional democracy has legitimate 
authority over its own citizens, at least when the legislative process is guided by 
appropriate reasons.45 I stress again that, in speaking of constitutional democra-
cies, I am referring to those states that in fact satisfy the criteria to be properly 
judged as a political regime of this type. In such a genuine constitutional democ-
racy, at least when citizens and legislators exercise their political rights guided 
by reasons of social and global justice and the common good of their society, I 
take it that the domestic law enacted by the state’s established procedures has 
legitimate authority. One type of domestic law is secondary immigration law: 
 44. Ibid at 179-83.
 45. See for example John Rawls, “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” (1997) 64:3 U Chicago 
L Rev 765; Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford University Press, 1999); David 
Estlund, Democratic Authority (Princeton University Press, 2008); Christiano, Constitution 
of Equality, supra note 16 at chs 6-7; Niko Kolodny, “Rule Over None II: Social Equality 
and the Justification of Democracy” (2014) 42:4 Philosophy & Public Affairs 287; Viehoff, 
“Democratic Equality and Political Authority”, supra note 17.
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the agents whose conduct this kind of immigration law seeks to regulate are not 
would-be migrants but current citizens. Hence, the secondary immigration law 
of a constitutional democratic receiving state has legitimate authority over that 
state’s current citizens.
 As a rejoinder to this appeal to the legitimate authority of a constitutional 
democracy’s domestic legislation, Hidalgo argues that any regime of law that 
systematically violates or facilitates the violation of human rights cannot have 
legitimate authority.46 He further urges that, because freedom of immigration is 
a human right, those secondary immigration laws that serve to implement im-
migration restrictions systematically facilitate the violation of human rights. As 
such, even if the domestic legislation of a constitutional democracy generally 
enjoys legitimate authority, its regime of secondary immigration law constitutes 
an important exception.47
 I agree that any regime of law that systematically violates, or contributes to the 
violation of, human rights lacks legitimate authority. But as I argued in Section 
3, we should reject the view that there is a human right to immigrate according 
to one’s choice, at least if we assume an internationalist conception of global jus-
tice. If freedom of immigration is not a human right, then a constitutional democ-
racy’s regime of secondary immigration law is not so systematically marked by 
egregious injustice that, by contrast with other parts of its domestic law, it lacks 
legitimate authority. As such, not only does the Illegitimacy PrincipleSIL rather 
than the Mere Injustice PrincipleSIL identify the appropriate standard by which to 
judge the justifiability of mere noncompliance with secondary immigration law, 
but the two principles also have substantively different practical implications.
 I want to emphasize, however, that when a constitutional democracy enacts 
primary immigration laws that violate human rights, for example by unduly re-
stricting the admission of refugees and family migrants, then those of its sec-
ondary immigration laws that serve to implement these immigration restrictions 
unjustly facilitate human rights violations. Such laws are egregiously unjust and 
hence illegitimate; as such, individual citizens have no conclusive duty to comply 
with them. Moreover, given individual citizens’ moral duty to avoid complicity 
in injustice, they will also have strong positive reasons to disobey secondary im-
migration laws of this kind. At least in those cases where a particular secondary 
immigration law is egregiously unjust, then, mere noncompliance by individual 
citizens is justified.
 A potential objection to this last claim is that noncompliance by those citizens 
who are public officials is impermissible even in the case of egregiously unjust 
laws, in virtue of those citizens’ role obligations as public officials. On this view, 
those citizens of a constitutional democracy who occupy official roles have a 
role-relative, content-independent moral duty to fulfil the legal obligations that 
 46. The claim here is not that there is no conclusive duty to comply with particular laws that vio-
late or facilitate the violation of human rights, but the more general claim that any institution or 
legal regime that systematically violates or facilitates the violation of human rights must lack 
legitimate authority altogether.
 47. See Hidalgo, “Duty to Disobey”, supra note 9 at 166-69, 179-80, 182-83.
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apply to them in their official capacity. A public official should not normally 
breach her role-specific legal obligations even when these conflict with her (cor-
rect) ethical, moral, and political convictions.48 If so, then mere noncompliance 
by public officials with the secondary immigration laws that apply to them in 
their official capacity is unjustified, even when these officials correctly judge the 
laws in question to be unjust.
 In my view, it is democratic legitimacy that best explains public officials’ 
putative content-independent moral duty to fulfil their role-specific legal obli-
gations.49 When officials carry out the requirements of their various respective 
roles, the laws legitimately enacted by their state’s constitutional democratic pro-
cedures are thereby implemented. But if officials discharged their role-specific 
legal obligations only when these legal directives are fully compatible with their 
individual moral beliefs, then given the inevitability of moral disagreement, sta-
ble arrangements for the implementation of legitimate laws would be impossible. 
It is in light of these considerations that officials have a content-independent 
moral duty to fulfil their role-specific legal obligations. Given this grounding, the 
scope of public officials’ role-relative moral duties do not extend to illegitimate 
laws. With one important exception that I will discuss in the next section, there-
fore, the conditions for justified mere noncompliance with secondary immigra-
tion law do not significantly differ between public officials and ordinary citizens.
5. Going beyond personal disobedience 
I have suggested that, at least in one sense, Hidalgo’s account of the justifiability 
of mere noncompliance with secondary immigration law goes too far. He holds 
that mere noncompliance by the individual citizens of a constitutional democ-
racy with their state’s secondary immigration laws is morally justified whenever 
these laws are unjust. By contrast, I have argued that, because a constitutional 
democracy’s regime of secondary immigration law has legitimate authority over 
its existing citizens, individual citizens of a constitutional democracy are only 
justified in violating one of their state’s secondary immigration laws when some 
legitimacy-defeating condition, such as egregious injustice, is present.
 Yet, in another sense, Hidalgo’s account does not go far enough. His argu-
ment for the justifiability of noncompliance by citizens focuses solely on one 
ground for refusing compliance, namely the moral imperative to avoid complic-
ity in injustice. I hope to show in this section why this narrow focus on avoiding 
complicity as the ground for justified noncompliance risks conveying an overly 
privatized understanding of justified resistance to injustice in immigration law, 
and to draw attention to another ground for justified noncompliance that has a 
more civic and public character.
 This further ground for noncompliance also appeals to moral reasons. Note, 
however, that by discussing only instances of principled—that is, morally 
 48. Something like this view is expressed in Michael Quinlan, “Ethics in the Public Service” 
(1993) 6:4 Governance: An Int’l J Policy and Administration 538.
 49. See Arthur Isak Applbaum, Ethics for Adversaries (Princeton University Press, 1999) at ch 4.
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motivated or conscientious—noncompliance, I do not mean to suggest that act-
ing for the sake of principle is the only way that mere noncompliance with sec-
ondary immigration law can be justified. I leave open the possibility that, in cer-
tain circumstances, mere noncompliance for nonmoral reasons is justified when 
a given law is illegitimate.50 Nevertheless, because the most salient instances of 
noncompliance with secondary immigration law are cases of principled noncom-
pliance, I devote particular attention to this kind of noncompliance.
 When citizens of a receiving state violate their state’s secondary immigration 
laws on the ground that their moral duty to avoid complicity in injustice requires 
them to do so, they engage in the type of principled noncompliance that, follow-
ing Kimberley Brownlee, I call personal disobedience.51 Acts of personal dis-
obedience are distinguished by their noncommunicative and nonpolitical nature. 
A personal disobedient violates a law because it commands actions that, she be-
lieves, are morally prohibited. However, she does not seek by her disobedience 
to publicly communicate any judgment about that law’s injustice nor to make a 
moral appeal to her co-citizens to reform the law in question. Joseph Raz thus 
aptly characterizes personal disobedience as “essentially a private action.”52 The 
private character of personal disobedience is underlined by the fact that it can be 
carried out entirely covertly or surreptitiously.53
 Hidalgo is certainly right to identify a receiving state’s citizens’ moral reasons 
to personally avoid complicity in institutional injustice as a potential ground of 
justified noncompliance with secondary immigration law. Suppose that a particu-
lar secondary immigration law of a constitutional democracy is tainted by egre-
gious, legitimacy-defeating injustice. In such a case, individual citizens have no 
duty to comply with the law in question, and their duty to avoid being complicit 
in injustice provides sufficient reasons in favor of disobeying the law to make 
their mere noncompliance morally justified.
 Nevertheless, there is a distinct (principled) ground for justified noncompli-
ance that Hidalgo does not discuss: citizens may refuse to comply in an effort to 
promote reform of unjust secondary immigration laws. This is a distinct moral 
motivation for noncompliance, even if reasons to promote the reform of unjust 
arrangements share with reasons to avoid complicity a common foundation in 
the natural duty of justice. This duty requires individuals, firstly, to practically 
accept and support just institutions, and secondly, to oppose institutional injustic-
es. The second requirement implies not only an imperative to avoid contributing 
to any institutional injustice—that is, to avoid being complicit in injustice—but 
also an imperative to actively “remove any injustices” by contributing to efforts 
 50. Many justified breaches of law take this form: they are morally justified or permissible but 
their motivation comes from other considerations. See Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law 
(Oxford University Press, 1979) at 263.
 51. Kimberley Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction (Oxford University Press, 2012) at 27-29. 
Other terms that have been applied to principled noncompliance that is noncommunicative and 
nonpolitical are conscientious objection, conscientious refusal, and conscientious evasion. See 
Raz, Authority of Law, supra note 50 at 263-64, 276; Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1 
at 368-69.
 52. Raz, Authority of Law, supra note 50 at 264.
 53. Brownlee, Conscience and Conviction, supra note 51 at 29.
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to reform existing institutions that are unjust.54 Breaches of law that, guided by 
this latter imperative, aim to promote the reform of unjust laws and policies are 
acts of civil disobedience.55
 In contrast to personal disobedience, civil disobedience is both communica-
tive and political. It is communicative in that civil disobedients use their breach-
es of law to call their co-citizens’ attention to the injustice of particular aspects 
of their state’s institutions, and to make a public moral appeal for reform. As an 
intervention in the public forum, civil disobedience cannot be undertaken in a 
wholly covert manner. While there might be sound strategic reasons for civil 
disobedients not to announce their intentions in advance—for example, so as not 
to provide the authorities with an opportunity to preemptively abort the intended 
breaches of law—civil disobedients must at some point publicize their breach of 
the law to their co-citizens.56 Civil disobedience is political since it is a form of 
contestation: civil disobedients break the law with the aim of persuading their 
co-citizens to support the reform of unjust laws and policies.57
 Because Hidalgo focuses on personal disobedience to the neglect of civil 
disobedience in his account of individual citizens’ justified noncompliance with 
unjust secondary immigration laws, he risks obscuring the moral significance of 
citizens’ status as citizens—that is, as equal sharers in their state’s authorization 
and exercise of political power, which in a constitutional democracy is ulti-
mately “the power of free and equal citizens as a collective body.”58 The citizens 
of a receiving state that has adopted unjust immigration laws can do more than 
simply acting to limit their personal contribution to the implementation of these 
unjust laws. They are also in a position to intervene in democratic deliberation 
and decision-making by means up to and including civil disobedience, with a 
view to persuading their co-citizens to support the repeal and reform of the laws 
in question.
 Indeed, some have plausibly suggested that citizens of a constitutional de-
mocracy should view civil disobedience as a “final device” that they can activate 
as a countermajoritarian check when legal forms of contestation have proven 
fruitless.59 There is a strong case for such a final checking device on immigration 
laws unilaterally enacted by states. Because the procedure by which a state’s 
immigration laws are enacted denies outsiders any formal opportunity for influ-
ence, such legislation has a worrying tendency to neglect the claims and interests 
 54. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1 at 246. On the natural duty of justice, see ibid at 115, 
334. See also the “communicative principle of conscientiousness” in Brownlee, Conscience 
and Conviction, supra note 51 at 29.
 55. This account of civil disobedience I take to be broadly compatible with both what William 
Scheuerman calls the “liberal model” and the “democratic model” of civil disobedience (Civil 
Disobedience (Polity, 2018) at chs 2-3).
 56. William Scheuerman, “Recent Theories of Civil Disobedience: An Anti-Legal Turn?” (2015) 
23:4 J Political Philosophy 427 at 440.
 57. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1 at 364-67; Robin Celikates, “Democratizing Civil 
Disobedience” (2016) 42:10 Philosophy and Social Criticism 953 at 985-86.
 58. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Harvard University Press, 2001) at 40.
 59. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1 at 382-84. See also Jürgen Habermas, “Civil 
Disobedience: Litmus Test for the Democratic Constitutional State” (1985) 30 Berkeley 
Journal of Sociology 95 at 103-05. 
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of would-be migrants and other noncitizens.60 Civil disobedience by individual 
citizens of a receiving state offers an important device to counteract these epis-
temic defects in the procedures by which states enact their immigration laws.
 I have pointed to civil disobedience as a distinct form of principled noncom-
pliance, and highlighted its value as an important device by which individual 
citizens of a constitutional democracy might oppose injustices in their state’s 
immigration laws. When are such civilly disobedient actions justified? By the 
Illegitimacy PrincipleSIL, civil disobedience—like any form of noncompliance 
with the secondary immigration laws of a constitutional democracy—is only jus-
tified as a response to immigration laws tainted by some legitimacy-defeating 
feature, such as egregious injustice. When immigration laws are egregiously un-
just, citizens will additionally have strong positive moral reasons, grounded in 
the natural duty of justice, to use civilly disobedient acts to contest them.
 Nonetheless, it is harder to morally justify civil disobedience than compa-
rable acts of personal disobedience, since the former’s public and political char-
acter risks encouraging others to “[resort] to disobedience to achieve whatever 
changes in law or policy they find justified,” thereby potentially undermining 
the stability of the state’s constitutional democratic system.61 The risk of desta-
bilizing or otherwise inflicting systemic damage on democratic institutions is 
especially great when public officials, such as immigration officers and provid-
ers of social services, engage in civil disobedience. Civil disobedience under-
taken by public officials has the potential to corrode the public’s confidence that 
officials are committed to upholding the rule of law and to remaining appropri-
ately politically neutral.62
 I therefore suggest that citizens of a constitutional democracy should only tar-
get injustices in their state’s immigration law via civil disobedience when they 
have already gone through legal channels of democratic contestation, without 
success.63 In addition, because civil disobedience is one way of discharging the 
nonideal imperatives of the natural duty of justice, namely to promote the reform 
of unjust institutions in the direction of greater justice, it should be guided by 
the general principles that apply to nonideal political action. Specifically, citizens 
should avoid acts of civil disobedience unless these are likely to be effective in 
persuading their co-citizens to enact more just immigration laws. If civil disobedi-
ence can be expected to provoke a backlash leading to the enactment of morally 
worse immigration legislation, for example, then it is unjustified.64 Beyond these 
 60. See Javier Hidalgo, “The Case for the International Governance of Immigration” (2016) 8:1 
Int’l Theory 140 at 144-54. Although states’ independent political control over immigration to 
their territories is vulnerable to these epistemic biases, I doubt that the moral risks associated 
with these biases are serious enough to wholly undermine the legitimate authority of constitu-
tional democracies’ unilaterally enacted regimes of immigration law.
 61. Raz, Authority of Law, supra note 50 at 262.
 62. Applbaum, Ethics for Adversaries, supra note 49 at 69-70. These bad systemic effects may 
well be the result of unwarranted reactions by the public; nonetheless, they should be taken 
into account in nonideal political action.
 63. Here I follow Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1 at 373.
 64. On the significance of expected effectiveness in nonideal political action, see Rawls, Law of 
Peoples, supra note 25 at 89. Contrary to Rawls’s earlier suggestion that those who undertake 
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general criteria, an additional constraint applies to public officials: they should 
only engage in civil disobedience if the urgency of opposing the immigration 
injustice being targeted for reform, and the boost to prospects for reform that their 
participation in civil disobedience is expected to provide, together outweigh the 
systemic risks their actions may pose to their state’s democratic institutions.
6. Conclusion
I have examined the conditions under which would-be migrants to, as well as 
current citizens of, a constitutional democracy would be morally justified in 
nonviolently breaching its primary and secondary immigration laws respec-
tively. I have argued that, contrary to the most developed account available, 
the injustice of an immigration law is not always sufficient to make mere non-
compliance morally justifiable. The regimes of primary and secondary immi-
gration law enacted by a constitutional democracy normally have legitimate 
authority, such that the subjects of these legal regimes have a presumptive moral 
duty to comply, even with immigration laws that are unjust to some degree. 
Noncompliance—even mere noncompliance—with immigration laws is justi-
fiable only for particular laws that are tainted by some legitimacy-defeating 
feature, such as egregious injustice.
 I stress, however, that my arguments should in no way be interpreted as a 
counsel of moral complacency. Firstly, many existing states claiming to be, or 
that are conventionally thought to be, constitutional democracies do not in fact 
meet even the minimal criteria to be properly judged as such. My claims about 
the legitimate authority of immigration law do not apply to the immigration law 
of such states. Secondly, many states among those that arguably do satisfy the 
criteria to be genuine constitutional democracies maintain highly restrictive re-
gimes of immigration law that exclude refugees and others who have a human 
rights-based claim to be admitted. This egregious injustice is, I have suggested, 
a legitimacy-defeating condition. My account thus implies that mere noncompli-
ance with the actual immigration law of even bona fide constitutional democra-
cies will frequently be justified. Moreover, nothing I have said should be taken to 
suggest that individuals should meet unjust immigration laws with passivity. On 
the contrary, citizens have a moral imperative to contest such laws—including, 
in appropriate circumstances, by engaging in civil disobedience.
expectably counterproductive acts of civil disobedience are merely “acting unwisely,” my claim 
is that their acts are morally unjustified (Rawls, A Theory of Justice, supra note 1 at 376).
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